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ABSTRACT
The popularity of smart-home assistant systems such as Amazon
Alexa and Google Home leads to a booming third-party applica-
tion market (over 70,000 applications across the two stores). While
existing works have revealed security issues in these systems, it is
not well understood how to help application developers to enforce
security requirements. In this paper, we perform a preliminary
case study to examine the security vetting mechanisms adopted
by Amazon Alexa and Google Home app stores. With a focus on
the authentication mechanisms between Alexa/Google cloud and
third-party application servers (i.e. end-points), we show the cur-
rent security vetting is insufficient as developer mistakes cannot
be effectively detected and notified. A weak authentication would
allow attackers to spoof the cloud to insert/retrieve data into/from
the application endpoints. We validate the attack through ethical
proof-of-concept experiments. To confirm vulnerable applications
have indeed passed the security vetting and entered the markets,
we develop a heuristic-based searching method. We find 219 real-
world Alexa endpoints that carry the vulnerability, many of which
are related to critical applications that control smart home devices
and electronic cars. We have notified Amazon and Google about
our findings and offered our suggestions to mitigate the issue.
1 INTRODUCTION
Smart home assistant systems such as Amazon Alexa and Google
Home are entering tens of millions of households today [37]. As a
result, the corresponding appmarketplace is also expanding quickly.
Just like installing apps on smartphones, users can enable third-
party applications for smart-assistant devices. These applications
are called “skills” or “actions”. So far there are collectively more
than 70,000 skills available [1, 2], many of which are security/safety-
critical. For example, there are skills that allow users to manage
bank accounts, place shopping orders, and control smart-home
devices through a voice interface.
Considering the sensitive nature of smart-home assistants, re-
searchers have looked into the security aspects of these systems
and their third-party applications. For example, recent studies show
that it is possible to craft a voice clip with hidden commands em-
bedded that are recognizable by the Alexa device but not by human
observers [6, 12, 46, 47]. In addition, researchers demonstrate the
feasibility of a “skill squatting” attack to invoke a malicious ap-
plication whose name sounds like the legitimate one [38, 50]. A
recent survey study [8] investigated the network interfaces of many
IoT devices (including smart-assistant devices) to reveal their weak
encryptions and unpatched OS/software. While most existing stud-
ies focus on the system and device-level flaws, limited efforts are
investigated to vetting the security of third-party applications, and
more importantly, helping developers to improve the security of their
applications.
In this paper, we perform a preliminary case study to examine
the mechanisms that Amazon and Google implemented to vet the
security of third-party applications for their smart home assistants.
More specifically, before a third-party application (or “skill”) can
be published to the app stores, they must go through a series of
automated tests and manual vetting. In this paper, we seek to un-
derstand (1) what aspects the security vetting process is focused
on, and (2) how effective the vetting process is to help developers
to improve security.
As a preliminary study, we focus on the authentication mecha-
nism used by the third-party application’s server (called “endpoint”)
to authenticate the Alexa/Google cloud (namely, cloud authenti-
cation). We choose cloud authentication because cloud-endpoint
interaction is a key component that makes smart-home assistant
skills1 structurally different from the conventional smartphone
apps. Smart-home assistant skills need to route their traffic to a
central cloud to translate a voice command to an API call in order
to interact with the application server.
Method and Key Observations. Amazon Alexa runs both au-
tomated vetting and manual vetting before a skill can be published,
while Google Home only runs manual vetting. Our methodology
is to build our own (vulnerable) skills and walk them through the
required testing to understand the vetting process. Our results show
concerning issues in terms of the enforcement of cloud authentica-
tion. First, we find that the Google Home vetting process does not
require the endpoints to authenticate the cloud and their queries,
which leaves the endpoints vulnerable to spoofed queries. Second,
Amazon Alexa requires skills to perform cloud authentication, but
does a poor job enforcing it on third-party developers. Alexa per-
forms automated vetting that is supposed to detect and inform
developer mistakes in the skill implementation. However, the se-
curity tests are erroneous and have missed important checks (e.g.,
application identifiers). As a result, a vulnerable skill, in theory, can
pass the security vetting process to enter the app store.
Proof-of-Concept. To illustrate the problem, we run controlled
experiments to show how an outsider can spoof the cloud to query
1For convenience, we refer smart-home assistant application as “skills” for both Ama-
zon Alexa and Google Home.
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the target endpoint. More specifically, an attacker can build its own
skill application, and use this skill to obtain a valid signature from
the cloud for the attack traffic. Then the attacker can replay the
signed traffic to attack the target endpoints. The attack is possible
because the cloud uses the same private key to sign all the traffic for
all the skills. The signature obtained by the attacker’s skill works
on the victim endpoint too. We validate the feasibility of the attack
and show that vulnerable skills can bypass both the automated tests
and the manual vetting process to enter the app markets.
Vulnerable Applications in the Wild. To confirm that there
are indeed vulnerable skills in practice, we perform a scanning
experiment. Since all Google Home skills are by default vulnerable,
this experiment focused on searching for vulnerable Alexa skills.
We leverage ZMap to locate live HTTPS hosts and replay a spoofed
but non-intrusive query to see if a given HTTPS host returns a valid
response. In this way, we located 219 vulnerable real-world Alexa
endpoints. A closer analysis shows that some of these vulnerable
endpoints are related to important skills such as those that con-
trol electric cars, smart locks, thermostats, security cameras, and
watering systems.
We make three main contributions:
• First, we present the first empirical analysis of the security
vetting process used by Amazon and Google to vet their
smart-home assistant skills. We find that the current vetting
process is insufficient to identify and notify developers of
the authentication issues in their endpoints.
• Second, we validate the security problem by running a proof-
of-concept cloud spoofing attack, in an ethical manner.
• Third, we discover real-world applications that carry the
vulnerability. We notified Amazon and Google about our
findings and offered our suggestions to mitigate the issue.
Our work makes a concrete step towards enhancing the security
vetting process of smart-assistant applications. Give the increasing
number and diversity of IoT applications and web of things, we
argue that developers need more help to build their applications in
a secure way. Effective security vetting and feedback will be critical
to improving the security of the IoT ecosystem.
2 BACKGROUND & MOTIVATION
We start by introducing the background for third-party applications
in Amazon Alexa and Google Home. We then discuss the security
vetting process on both platforms.
Alexa and Google Home Skills. Both platforms support third-
party applications, which are called “Skills” on Alexa and are called
“Actions” on Google Home. We use “skill” for convenience. They
work in a similar way. Figure 1 shows how a user interacts with
a skill. (❶) a user talks to the edge device to issue a voice com-
mand. (❷) the edge device passes the audio to the Alexa cloud. (❸)
the cloud is responsible to convert the speech to text, and recog-
nize which skill the user is trying to interact with. In addition, the
cloud infers the “intent” of the command and match it with the
known intents pre-defined by the skill developers. Here, intent is a
short string to represent a functionality of the skill. After that, the
cloud sends an HTTPS request to the skill’s endpoint (i.e., a web
server). (❹) the endpoint sends the response back, and (❺) the cloud
Figure 1: The execution of a simple voice command.
converts the text-based response to audio, and (❻) plays it at the
edge-device. Note that the edge device never directly interact with
the endpoint, and every request is routed through the cloud. For
certain skills, users need to explicitly “enable” them in the skill store.
However, many skills can be directly triggered/used by calling the
skill’s name.
Skill developers need to implement the endpoint to respond to
user requests. For simple skills that do not require a database, both
Alexa and Google provide a “serverless” option for developers to
hard-code the responses in the cloud. For sophisticated skills, an
endpoint is needed.
Authentication between Entities. The system contains three
main entities: the edge device, the cloud, and the endpoint. Both
Alexa and Google require HTTPS for all network communications.
This also helps the “clients” to authenticate the “servers”: The edge
device can verify the identity of the cloud, and the cloud can also
verify the identity of the endpoint.
For the other direction, two main authentications are used for
the “servers” to authenticate the “clients”. First, in step❷, the cloud
needs to authenticate the edge device. This can be done because an
“access token” has been exchanged when the user first sets up the
edge device at home. Second, in step ❸, the endpoint also needs
to authenticate the cloud. This step helps the endpoint to ensure
that the queries are indeed coming from the Alexa/Google cloud
instead of outsiders. We call it “cloud authentication”, which is done
in different ways for Google and Alexa.
• Amazon Alexa uses a public-key based method. The cloud
signs its request payload with a private key, and the skill
endpoints can verify the signature using the cloud’s public
key when receiving the request. The verification is required.
• Google Home does not require authentication between the
cloud and the endpoints.
Security Vetting Process. To make sure the skill and the end-
point are implemented properly, there are two types of vetting
deployed by Amazon Alexa and Google Home.
• Automated Skill Vetting. Alexa requires a skill to pass a se-
ries of tests before allowing the skill to enter the app store.
The test is fully automated and covers both functional tests
and security tests. Google Home, however, doesn’t have an
automated test for the skill endpoint.
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• Manual Vetting. For both Alexa and Google, there are dedi-
cated teams that perform manual vetting on the skill before
publishing the skill.
Our Focus. Our goal is to perform a case study to learn how
effective the security vetting is and how well it helps developers
to develop secure skills. We primarily focus on cloud authentica-
tion between the cloud and the third-party endpoints because it is
entirely implemented by the skill developers. In addition, the cloud-to-
endpoint communication is also the key reason why smart-assistant
skills are fundamentally different from conventional mobile apps —
there is a need for the cloud in the middle to translate a voice com-
mand to an API call. One might ask — why it is Amazon/Google’s
responsibility to ensure the third-party servers authenticate the
cloud. We argue that app developers often lack the security expe-
rience [7, 39, 40]. As such, Amazon and Google, as the app store
operators, are in the best position to act as the gatekeeper to ensure
all the developer components that interact with their infrastructure
(i.e., the cloud) are securely implemented. This helps to create a
more secure ecosystem that is in the best interest of both Amazon/-
Google and developers/users. Note that other authentication steps
that are implemented by Google/Amazon teams (instead of devel-
opers) are not considered in this paper (potential future works).
3 AUTOMATED SKILL VETTING
We start with Alexa’s automated skill vetting (since Google Home
does not have an automated skill vetting process). Our goal is to
understand what security tests are running against the skill under
vetting. Then we build our own skills, deliberately leave mistakes,
and examine if the automated tests can detect them.
3.1 Setting Up Vulnerable Skills
We implement an Alexa skill with 6 different versions and each
version contains different security or functional errors.
Supported Intents. Every Alexa skill should support 6 de-
fault command-lines defined by Amazon Alexa, and at least 1
custom command-lines defined by the developer. The 6 default
command-lines are mapped to 6 built-in intents. These intents in-
clude “LaunchRequest”, “StopIntent”, “CancelIntent”, “FallbackIn-
tent”, “HelpIntent”, and “NavigateHomeIntent”, which are used
to perform the basic controls of the skill. We implement the skill
to support all 6 default intents and 1 custom intent that takes an
integer parameter.
HTTPS Certificate. Both Alexa and Google require HTTPS
for the endpoints. Two types of certificates are allowed including
standard certificate and wildcard certificate. For our experiment, we
test both types of valid certificate, and use a self-signed certificate
as the baseline.
Implementing theCloudAuthentication. The cloud authen-
tication is used for the endpoints to authenticate the incoming re-
quests from the cloud. According to the Alexa documentation, the
request from the cloud will contain the signature from the cloud.
In addition, each request also contains an application-ID which
indicates which application (skill) this request is intended for; and a
timestamp. Below, we develop 6 different versions of the endpoints:
Implementation
Certificate Options
Standard Wildcard Invalid
Pass? #Req. Pass? #Req. Pass? #Req.
Valid ✓ 30 ✓ 30 ✗ 23
Ignore App-ID ✓ 30 ✓ 30 ✗ 23
Ignore Time ✓ 30 ✓ 30 ✗ 23
Accept All ✗ 30 ✗ 30 ✗ 23
Reject All ✗ 35 ✗ 35 ✗ 33
Offline ✗ 0 ✗ 0 ✗ 0
Table 1: Results of Alexa automated test. We have 18 differ-
ent settings. For each setting, we report whether the skill
passed the test, and the number of testing requests that the
endpoint received.
(1) Valid implementation: For a given request, we validate
the cloud signature, application-ID, and timestamp before
sending a response.
(2) Ignoring application-ID: Everything is implemented cor-
rectly, except that we ignore the application-ID.
(3) Ignoring timestamp: Everything is implemented correctly,
except that we ignore the timestamp.
(4) Accepting all requests: We do not perform authentication,
and always return a legitimate response.
(5) Rejecting all requests: We drop all the requests.
(6) Offline endpoint: The endpoint is not online.
3.2 Skill Testing Results
We tested our skill with 18 different settings (3 certificates × 6 end-
point implementations) in September 2019. As shown in Table 1,
standard certificate and the wildcard certificate return the same re-
sults. However, when using an invalid certificate (self-signed), even
the correct implementation could not pass the test. The test was
terminated immediately when the invalid certificate was detected.
This result indicates that the automated tests have successfully
identified invalid certificates.
As shown in Table 1, the “Accepts All” implementation failed to
pass the test. Analyzing the server logs shows that Alexa cloud has
sent a number of queries that carry empty or invalid signatures.
If we accept these requests, Alexa will determine the endpoint is
vulnerable and should not be published in the store.
However, we notice that the “Ignore Application-ID” and “Ignore
Timestamp” implementations both passed the automated test. This
means that if the endpoint validates the signature but ignores the
application-ID or the timestamp, the skill can still proceed to be
published. The result raises a major concern. Without validating
the application-ID, an endpoint may accept a (malicious) request
that is not intended for itself. Our attack in the next section will
further exploit this vulnerability.
4 SPOOFING THE CLOUD
The above experiment has two takeaways. First, Alexa enforces the
endpoint to validate the signature of the incoming request; This
means that published skills only accept incoming requests signed
by Alexa. Second, Alexa does not enforce the endpoint to validate
the application-ID or the timestamp. This means it’s possible a skill
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Figure 2: The cloud spoofing attack.
endpoint may accept and process outdated requests or requests that
are not intended to itself. This can lead to a cloud spoofing attack.
Attacking Method. Given a target skill (the victim), the at-
tacker’s goal is to spoof the cloud to interact with the endpoint to
insert or retrieve data. We use Figure 2 to describe the attack pro-
cess. The idea is that the attacker builds its own skill, and use this
skill to sign the malicious request that will be used for the attack.
(❶) the attacker registers its own skill and the mocking intent. The
mocking intent should mimic one of the victim skill’s intents (so
that the crafted payload is understandable by the victim endpoint).
(❷) Both Alexa and Google have a text interface that allows the
developers to type in their command-lines for testing purposes.
Using this text interface, the attacker can trigger the cloud to send
a request with malicious payload to its own endpoint. (❸) At this
point, the request already carries a valid signature signed by the
Alexa cloud. (❹) The attacker can record this request and then
replay it to the target endpoint. The victim endpoint will believe
that the request is from the Alexa cloud. Since the Alexa cloud uses
the same private key to sign all the requests for all the skills, the
signature signed for one skill works for other skills too.
An endpoint can detect this attack if the endpoint checks the
application-ID in the request. Even though the request is signed, the
application-ID inside of the request is still the ID of the attacker’s
skill. Because the application-ID is inserted by the Alexa cloud
before signing the payload, the attacker cannot modify this field.
Proof-of-Concept Experiment. The ability to spoof the cloud
can lead to different attacks ranging from injecting malicious pay-
load to the victim endpoint to extracting important data from the
endpoint. This is different from public-facing web services since
skill endpoints are not designed to be public-facing. The servers
only expect incoming requests from the cloud. To validate the ef-
fectiveness of the spoofing attack, we set up our own target skill
A as the victim. The victim endpoint A is configured to “ignore
application-ID and timestamp”. Then we simulate an attacker by
building another skill B, and use the endpoint of B to collect the
malicious requests that will be replayed. We perform this test for
both Alexa and Google Home to trigger all 6 default command lines
in A (e.g., to launch or pause the skills). The results show all the
attacks were successful.
Figure 3: Vulnerable skill in the Alexa Skill Store.
SQL Injection Attack. Attackers may perform SQL injection
attacks on top of the cloud spoofing. The idea is to design a mali-
cious SQL statement and then get the payload signed by the cloud
using her own skill. Then the attacker can replay the signed SQL
statement to the victim endpoint. To validate the feasibility, we run
an attack on our own skill. We target the skill’s Custom Intent that
has an integer parameter. The skill server does not have any SQL
injection defense (e.g., input sanitization). We run a series of SQL
injection attacks (e.g., inserting data, dropping a table), all of which
are executed successfully. In practice, this attack might be more dif-
ficult since attackers may not have the full knowledge of the victim
endpoints. The attacker needs to guess: (1) the intent name and its
parameter name; (2) the name of the target table; (3) the name of
the target column. For example, existing SQL injection tools such
as SQLMap [3] and web vulnerability scanners [19] would crawl
the corresponding websites, find candidate URLs, and issue a large
volume of testing queries. It might take hundreds or thousands of
automated guesses to search for an injection opportunity (out of
the scope of this paper). For Items (2)–(3), there is a way to find
related metadata in many mainstream databases. For example, the
MySQL database has a metadata table that contains information
about all the table names and column names.
Ethical Considerations. The experiments above are ethical
since both the attacker endpoint and the victim endpoint are devel-
oped by us. The tests are conducted in the developing mode. There
are no other skill endpoints or users involved in the experiments.
5 MANUAL VETTING
Before publishing, a skill needs to be vetted manually by Amazon
and Google teams. To understand the manual vetting process, we
send our vulnerable skills (vulnerable to spoofing and SQL injec-
tion) for publishing. During the submission process, we did not
receive any suggestions related to security issues. Both skills re-
ceived approval to be released within 1–2 weeks. Figure 3 shows the
screenshot of our published skill page (the screenshot for Google is
omitted for brevity). We immediately took the skill down from both
stores after the experiment and informed Google and Amazon about
our research. The result suggests that the current vetting process
is not rigorous enough to help developers to detect vulnerabilities.
Ethical Considerations. We took active steps to ensure re-
search ethics. At the high level, this skill is a “vulnerable” skill
instead of a “malicious” skill. It is supposed to be the victim instead
of the attacker in the threat model, which should not introduce
any malicious impact. One concern of publishing a vulnerable skill
is that the skill may be accidentally used by an innocent user. To
avoid this, we have closely monitored our skill endpoint through-
out the releasing process. Once the skill received the approval, we
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IPs enable
Port443
Round 1 Round 2 Total
Domain
Set
Candidate
Hosts
Vul.
EPoints
Vul.
EPoints
Vul.
EPoints
48,141,053 3,196 3,346,425 122 100 219
Table 2: Searching results of vulnerable endpoints.
immediately performed a quick test to ensure the skill is truly avail-
able on the store, and then took it down from the store right away.
During this process, we monitored our server and we did not see
any incoming requests (except those from our own). This means
no real users have ever used this vulnerable skill. In addition, the
skill is designed to provide information (about Computer Science
programs in the US), without collecting any user data. Even if a
user accidentally used the skill, there is no actual harm.
6 ALEXA VULNERABLE ENDPOINTS
So far, we show that the security vetting process is not rigorous
enough to prevent a vulnerable skill from entering the app store.
Next, we focus on Alexa skills and examine whether there are in-
deed real-world vulnerable skill endpoints. Google Home skills
are by default vulnerable to spoofing and thus are omitted in this
measurement.
6.1 Methodology to Locate Skill Endpoints
For this analysis, we aim to detect endpoints vulnerable to cloud
spoofing. We did not further test SQL injection considering the
intrusive nature of SQL injection attacks. We face two main chal-
lenges. First, the smart assistant devices (edge device) do not directly
interact with the skill endpoints. Instead, all the network traffic is
first routed to the Amazon cloud. As such, it is difficult for outsiders
(i.e., researchers) to know the IP or domain name of the endpoint.
Second, even if the IP is known, the skill service is not necessarily
always hosted under the root path.
Method Overview. We propose a heuristic-based searching
method, based on two intuitions. First, a skill endpoint is required
to support HTTPS, which means the port 443 should be open. Sec-
ond, an Alexa endpoint should support the default intents such
as “LaunchRequest” and “StopIntent”. The response for a default
intent request should follow the special JSON format defined by
Alexa. As such, we search for vulnerable skill endpoints by scan-
ning the HTTPS hosts with a testing query. The query carries
the spoofed “LaunchRequest” intent which is a default intent that
every Alexa skill should support. We choose this intent because
“LaunchRequest” won’t cause any internal state change or reveal
any non-public information.
Implementation. Given the large number of HTTPS hosts and
the need for guessing the path, it is not feasible to test a large number
of possible paths on all HTTPS hosts. As such, we prioritize search
efficiency by sacrificing some coverage. First, we focus on a small
set of HTTPS hosts and test many possible paths. Then we select
the most common path to scan the rest HTTPS hosts.
For round-1, we select a small set of HTTPS hosts that are more
likely to be the skill endpoints. More specifically, we crawled 32,289
Alexa skills pages from Amazon store, and extract their URLs of the
privacy Policies. Our hypothesis is that the skill endpoint might
share the same domain name with the privacy policy URL. Note
that some skills host their privacy policy on cloud services (e.g.,
“amazonaws.com”). As such, we make a whitelist of web hosting
services and only consider the hostname (instead of the domain
name) in their privacy policy URLs as the candidate.
Then we test a list of possible paths. We obtain the path infor-
mation by analyzing the example code on the Developer Forum
of Alexa and related question threads in StackOverflow [4, 5]. For
each host, we test the root path “/”, and other possible paths in-
cluding “/alexa”, “/echo”, “/api”, “/endpoint”, “/skill”, “/iot”, “/voice”,
“/assistant”, and “/amazon”.
After round-1, we expect to find some real-world skill endpoints.
Then, we select the most common non-root path name. We use this
pathname and the root path to test all the HTTPS hosts that have
not been tested in round-1.
Ethical Considerations. We have taken active steps to ensure
research ethics. First, for each host, we only send a handful of
queries which has minimal impact on the target host. Second, as
detailed below, we re-use the ZMap scanning results [20] instead
of performing our own network-wise scanning to identify HTTPS
hosts. The scope is alignedwith ZMap port 443 scanning.We respect
Internet hosts that don’t want to be scanned by ZMap and did not
test these hosts. Third, we only test a non-intrusive Intent that does
not cause any internal state change of the skill service or reveal
any non-public information.
6.2 Detecting Vulnerable Skill Endpoints
We start by obtaining a list of 48,141,053 IPv4 addresses with an
open 443 port from ZMap’s scanning result archive [20].
Round-1 Search. As shown in Table 2, we obtained the Privacy
policy URLs from all the 32,289 skills available in the Alexa U.S.
skill store. We extracted 3,196 unique domain names. By matching
these domain names with those of the 48 million HTTPS hosts, we
got 3,346,425 candidate hosts.
By testing the spoofed intent (and candidate paths), we found
122 Alexa skill endpoints that provided a valid response. Here we
use an IP address to uniquely represent an endpoint server. In fact,
we have identified 174 URLs that have returned a valid response.
Some of the URLs are actually mapped to the same IP address.
Round-2 Search. Based on the round-1 result, we find that
“/alexa” is the most common path (88 out of 174), followed by the
root path (30 out of 174). Next, we use these two paths to perform
the round-2 searching. As shown in Table 2, we discovered 100
additional vulnerable endpoints.
Vulnerable Skill Endpoints. From the two rounds of search-
ing, we detected in total 219 vulnerable Alexa endpoints. It should
be noticed that searching result is only a lower-bound considering
the incomplete guessing of pathnames. There could be even more
vulnerable skill endpoints in the wild.
Figure 4 illustrates the geolocation distribution of these vulnera-
ble endpoints based on their countries. We observe that more than
half of vulnerable endpoints (115, 52.5%) are located in the United
States, followed by Germany (35, 16.0%) and Ireland (16, 7.3%). The
top 3 countries cover 75.8% of all vulnerable endpoints.
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Figure 4: Geo-location of 219 vulnerable endpoints.
6.3 Case Studies
To understand what the vulnerable endpoints represent, we send an-
other spoofed “HelpIntent” request to each endpoint. The returned
information helps to identify the actual skills. Some vulnerable
skills are less “safety-critical” which are related to games, sports,
and news. However, there are indeed skills that are providing criti-
cal services. For example, one vulnerable skill on Alexa is used for
controlling electric cars. At least three vulnerable skills are from
online banking services. A number of vulnerable skills are used to
control other smart-home or IoT devices to turn on/off the bedroom
light, adjust the air purifier and thermostats, set an alarm for the
home security system, and keep track of water and electricity usage.
Leaving their endpoints vulnerable to cloud spoofing poses real
threats to users. We give a few specific examples below.
Smart Home. “Brunt” is an automated home furnishing ac-
cessory company, and its products include smart plugs, wireless
chargers, air purifiers, blind controllers, and power sockets. The
vulnerable skill “Brunt” supports turning on and off Brunt devices
and changing their configurations.
Connected Cars. “My Valet” is one of the most popular skills
that can control Tesla cars. The skill can be used remotely to lock
and unlock the car, obtain information of the car’s current location,
and open the roof and the trunk. Note that the skill is not officially
developed by Tesla. To use it, My Valet redirects a user to My Valet’s
own website and ask for the user’s password for her Tesla account
(instead of using OAuth). This is already a questionable method to
access user account. In addition, the skill’s endpoint is vulnerable
to cloud spoofing, exposing itself to further risks.
Social & Communication. “Newton Mail” is a cross-platform
email client, supporting reading recent emails and other common
operations such as snoozing and deletion of an email.
7 RELATEDWORK
IoT Security & Privacy. With the wide adoption of IoT devices,
security and privacy have become a pressing issue [9, 13, 15, 17,
30, 36, 42, 51, 52]. A large body of existing works focuses on the
security of software and firmware of the IoT devices [31, 32, 34],
and measurements of IoT botnets [14, 33]. A more related direc-
tion looks into the user authentication schemes of IoT devices [27,
35, 44, 48, 49]. Due to a lack of authentication, malicious parties
may inject command-lines [11, 41] and control the device through
inaudible voice [47]. Our work is complementary by focusing on
cloud authentication (instead of user-end authentication).
Third-party Applications for IoTDevices. Researchers have
analyzed the third-party applications for Samsung-owned Smart-
Things [18, 28, 29]. For example, a recent study on 185 SmartThings
applications found 37 risky physical interaction chains [18]. Other
researchers also examined the attack surface of IoT triggered IFTTT
applets [13, 45]. A study [10] showed that 30% of the IFTTT applets
have violated the privacy expectations. Two recent works studied
Alexa and Google Home skills with a focus on their voice inter-
faces [38, 50]. Our work is different since we focus on authentication
between the cloud and third-party endpoints.
App Developers and Security Coding. A related body of
work focuses on understanding the mistakes made by app de-
velopers and how to help developers to improve security. Most
existing works focus on Android apps. For example, researchers
show that many poorly implemented security mechanisms in mo-
bile apps are due to developers who are inexperienced, distracted
or overwhelmed [7] or copying and pasting code from online fo-
rums [40]. Researchers also find developers asking more permission
than they need [25, 26, 43] or failing to use cryptographic API cor-
rectly [16, 21–24]. Even with tools to help the developers in the
Android development environment, it is often not enough to pre-
vent insecure apps [43]. While most existing works are focused
on smartphone apps, we for the first time investigate this issue in
smart assistant systems. Our result shows that more work needs to
be done to help the developers.
8 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
The problem described in the paper comes from the insufficient
security vetting process before releasing the applications into the
market. More specifically, there is a confusion between cloud and
application-level authentication in Alexa’s automated testing. Alexa
enforced an endpoint to verify the cloud identity but did not enforce
the verification of the application identity. This makes endpoints
vulnerable to replayed requests that were intended for other appli-
cations (e.g., the attacker’s skill). We show that developers indeed
left this vulnerability in published skills. Part of the reason is that
smart-home devices involve complex interactions between different
entities, making it more challenging for inexperienced developers
to write code securely. To this end, platforms such as Google and
Amazon have a bigger responsibility to rigorously test third-party
skills before allowing them to enter the stores.
We have reported our findings to the Alexa and Google Home
team and informed them about our experiments. The countermea-
sure is to implement dedicated skill tests and enforce developers to
check the application-ID and the timestamp. We also plan to notify
the corresponding skill developers to address the issue.
Limitations and Future Directions. Our work has a few limi-
tations. First, our searching only covers a limited number of “paths”.
The number of vulnerable endpoints can only be interpreted as a
lower bound. Future works may extend the scanning scope. Second,
we only confirmed that the endpoints were vulnerability to cloud
spoofing attacks. We did not further test SQL injection attacks for
ethical considerations. Future works (with the consent of the skills
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developers) may explore the feasibility of actual attacks. Third, we
only look into the cloud-to-endpoint authentication. Future work
can further examine other authentication steps (e.g., account link-
ing, OAuth) and other security and privacy aspects (e.g., HTTPS
implementation, permission management, privacy policies).
An open question is how to design the security vetting process
to effectively help developers. There are two main future directions
for exploration. First, we need to improve the coverage of the au-
tomated tests to perform more security checks. Second, we need
to provide informative and actionable feedback to developers. We
could even integrate the checking-and-feedback mechanism into
the software development kit (SDK) to improve the security during
the skill development process.
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